The Supreme Court of India, as the apex judicial authority in the country, is expected to uphold the principles of justice, fairness, and equality before the law. However, a closer examination of its treatment of cases concerning the Waqf Act reveals troubling discrepancies that raise questions about consistency and impartiality. This article critiques the perceived double standards exhibited by the Supreme Court in handling the petitions filed by Ashwini Upadhaya against the 1995 amendments to the Waqf Act and subsequent petitions challenging the 2025 amendments.
Context of the Cases
In 1995, significant amendments were made to the Waqf Act, aimed at reforming the governance of waqf properties in India. These changes were designed to enhance transparency and accountability within the waqf management system. Ashwini Upadhaya, a lawyer and activist, filed a petition challenging these amendments, asserting that they infringed upon constitutional rights and lacked sufficient legislative scrutiny. During the proceedings, the Supreme Court posed critical questions regarding his locus standi—essentially asking whether he had the legal right to bring this case before the court and why he chose to approach the Supreme Court directly rather than pursuing remedies at lower courts.
In contrast, when multiple petitions emerged challenging the 2025 amendments to the Waqf Act, the Supreme Court’s response was markedly different. Without raising similar queries about locus standi or the procedural appropriateness of directly approaching the highest court, the petitions were admitted for hearing. This stark divergence in approach raises significant concerns about fairness and uniformity in judicial proceedings.
Locus Standi and Judicial Discretion
Locus standi is a fundamental principle in legal proceedings, ensuring that only individuals or entities with a direct interest in a matter have the right to initiate litigation. In Upadhaya’s case, the Supreme Court’s insistence on establishing his locus standi before admitting the petition suggests an adherence to procedural rigor. However, when confronted with the 2025 amendments, the court seemingly relaxed this requirement, allowing multiple petitions to be entertained without similar scrutiny.
This inconsistency raises pertinent questions about the criteria the Supreme Court employs to assess the admissibility of cases. Legal experts argue that such differential treatment undermines the foundational principles of justice by creating an impression of bias or favoritism. The lack of consistent application of the rules governing locus standi risks eroding public trust in the judiciary’s commitment to impartiality.
Implications of Judicial Decisions
The Supreme Court’s differing responses to these cases carry broader implications for public perception of the judiciary. When citizens perceive that the judicial system operates with double standards, it can lead to disillusionment with legal institutions. The judiciary is often seen as the guardian of the Constitution and the protector of individual rights; any indication of partiality can diminish its moral authority.
Moreover, the public’s trust in the rule of law hinges on the belief that all litigants are treated equitably, regardless of their background or the nature of their claims. The apparent leniency shown towards the 2025 amendment petitions, juxtaposed with the rigorous scrutiny faced by Upadhaya, suggests an arbitrary application of judicial standards that could undermine the legitimacy of the court’s decisions.
Potential Reasons for Differential Treatment
Several factors may contribute to the Supreme Court’s contrasting approaches in these two instances. Firstly, the political context surrounding the amendments could play a role. The 1995 amendments were enacted during a different political climate, and their challenge might have been viewed through a lens of heightened scrutiny, particularly given the historical sensitivity surrounding waqf properties and their management.
Secondly, the nature of the amendments might have influenced the court’s decision-making process. The 2025 amendments may have been perceived as more contentious or urgent, prompting the court to expedite hearings without the same level of procedural inquiry applied to earlier cases. However, these interpretations should not serve as justifications for inconsistent application of judicial standards.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s handling of petitions related to the Waqf Act presents a troubling case study in judicial double standards. The contrasting treatment of Ashwini Upadhaya’s petition against the 1995 amendments and the later petitions challenging the 2025 amendments raises critical questions about the principles of fairness, consistency, and impartiality that are essential to the functioning of the judiciary.
For the integrity of the legal system to be upheld, it is vital that the Supreme Court maintains a uniform standard in assessing the admissibility of cases. Any deviation from this standard not only risks undermining public trust in the judiciary but also challenges the foundational tenets of justice that the court is sworn to protect. Moving forward, a commitment to consistency in judicial proceedings will be crucial in reinforcing the legitimacy and moral authority of the Supreme Court in the eyes of the public.
